New Research by Mixon Examines Foreign Fighter Participation in the Russo-Ukrainian War

An intriguing stream of public choice research that has developed over the past few decades examines whether the disposition of military casualties during conflicts is, at times, impacted by the political desires of the government officials who are in a position to influence that disposition. A new study by Turner College economist Frank Mixon and his colleague Richard Cebula of the University of Tennessee extends this literature by exploring the political economy of death among foreign fighters in the Russo-Ukrainian War since the 24 February 2022 invasion. More specifically, the study explores the role played by demographic factors, military institutions, and international trade relations in determining the number of foreign fighters from various countries who have died in support of either Ukraine or Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Unlike prior research, however, Mixon's study, which is set to appear in a future issue of the Journal of Institutional Economics, also examines the importance of economic freedom and democracy in shaping the choices made my individuals around the globe to venture to, and die fighting in, Ukraine.

     In terms of the demographic factors, distance from the theater of war (i.e., Ukraine) matters, as individuals from more distant countries are less likely to participate in support of either side than are those more closely situated to the battlefields. Additionally, regardless of which side is being supported, foreign fighters who die on the battlefields of Ukraine tend to arrive there from lower income countries. In the case of support for Russia, the income effect is significantly negative. With regard to military institutions, NATO countries contribute only 5% to 21.7% of the battlefield deaths in support of Russia that non-NATO countries contribute, while NATO membership is effectively unrelated to the geographic origin of the foreign fighters who have died in support of Ukraine’s defense. Other results indicate that foreign fighter deaths in support of Ukraine tend to emanate more from countries with relatively large standing armies, while those in support of Russia tend to emanate from countries with smaller standing armies. Additionally, countries contributing more financially to Ukraine’s defense are also found to be the source more foreign fighter battlefield deaths in defense of Ukraine. According to the study, each additional €1 billion in military aid sent to Ukraine is associated with about 5.5% more battlefield deaths from that country. Lastly, the results for institutions related to economic freedom and democracy suggest that economically freer and more democratic countries are associated with more foreign fighter battlefield deaths in support of Ukraine, and fewer foreign fighter battlefield deaths in support of Russia, than are their less economically free and less democratic counterparts. For example, a one-unit increase in a country’s economic freedom index is associated with between 8% and 15.8% more foreign fighter deaths in support of Ukraine, and between 5.3% and 6.8% fewer foreign fighter battlefield deaths in support of Russia. In terms of democracy, a one-unit increase in a country’s democracy index is associated with between 16.9% and 18.6% more foreign fighter battlefield deaths in support of Ukraine, and between 21.7% and 24% fewer foreign fighter battlefield deaths in support of Russia.